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A SECOND TAKE: RE-EXAMINING OUR
REGULATORY TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE POST-TAHOE
Robert W. DiUbaldo*
INTRODUCTION
The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment pre-
supposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it
shall not be taken for such use without compensation .... When
this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by
the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private
property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this
way under the Constitution of the United States.1
- Justice Holmes
Since the Bill of Rights gave birth to modern American "tak-
ings" law over 200 years ago, courts have struggled to balance the
conflict between an individual's property rights and the protection
of society as a whole. Recently, the Supreme Court has applied
several techniques to determine when a government action has ef-
fectuated a compensable taking.2 The result is a combination of
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helping me write this Comment as well as the editors and staff of the Fordham Urban
Law Journal for their efforts throughout this process. I would also like to thank Ford-
ham University Dean William M. Treanor, whose teachings in my first year Property
course inspired this piece. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for
their love, support, and encouragement.
1. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
2. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 335 (2002) (refusing to adopt a categorical rule that awards compensation to all
temporary takings in which a landowner is deprived of all economically viable use of
his land); Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (0' Connor, J., concur-
ring) (applying a fact-based test to regulatory takings that weighs the relevant circum-
stances of each particular case); Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016(1992) (adopting the categorical rule that when a regulation deprives an owner of all
economically beneficial use of his land, he must be awarded compensation); First En-
glish Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,
318 (1987) (noting that temporary takings should be evaluated the same as permanent
takings); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501 (1987)(focusing on the entire bundle of the landowners property rights rather than one seg-
ment of the property interest); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
1949
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per se rules and balancing tests that have made defining a land-
owner's property interest more difficult.' For example, the Su-
preme Court has adopted the per se rule that a landowner who is
completely deprived of all "economically beneficial" use of her
land must be awarded compensation,' unless she is using her land
in a way contrary to the "background principles of the state's law
of property and nuisance."' 5 Determining exactly when and how
this "total deprivation" occurs has been subject to much debate,
particularly because of the Supreme Court's admonition to look at
the "value of the parcel as a whole" when examining if there is a
compensable taking.6 Thus, when faced with a regulation that de-
prives a landowner of use of ninety percent of her property, it is
unclear whether the situation would be analyzed as one in which
the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of
the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere dimunition in the value of the tract as a whole.7 As
a result, a "partial" regulation that denies a landowner use of a
104, 123-24 (1978) (outlining a balancing test to apply to regulatory takings and focus-
ing on the value of the land "as a whole").
3. See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 783 (1995) (arguing that modern takings
jurisprudence has misinterpreted the original understanding of the Takings Clause);
see also Robert J. Hopperton, Ohio Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence:
An Analytical Framework, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 358 (describing the analytical
framework applied in regulatory takings as a "work in progress"); James E. Krier, The
Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997) (noting that regulatory
takings are widely regarded as a puzzle); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) ("The courts have developed a bewildering array of
rules for determining when a taking occurs."); Tyrone T. Bongard, Comment, Does
Palozollo v. Rhode Island's Upholding of the Transferability of Takings Claims Re-
quire a Rethinking of Takings Jurisprudence, 81 N.C. L. REV. 392, 393 (2002) (arguing
the inability to formulate a coherent takings jurisprudence has resulted in Supreme
Court decisions that undercut the principles of fairness and equity that underlie this
Bill of Rights guarantee).
4. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
5. Id. at 1029.
6. Compare Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327 (noting that in regulatory takings cases,
we most focus on the "parcel as a whole" and view property "in its entirety"), and
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31 (focusing on the landowner's property
interest as a whole as compared to only a segment of the land affected), with Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1016 (the "parcel as a whole" rule does not make clear the property inter-
est against which the loss of value is to be measured), and Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that the government's imposition of a
public boating easement connecting a private marina to the ocean was a taking based
on the principle that it violated the "right to exclude," a fundamental stick in the
landowners bundle of rights).
7. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
1950
2003] RE-EXAMINING REGULATORY TAKINGS
significant amount of her property is less likely to be found a tak-
ing than a "total" regulation that results in only a minor loss of
value to the property.8 This partial/total distinction seems to be at
odds with the primary purpose of the Takings Clause-to provide a
fair and just means of protecting private property.9
The Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, further embel-
lished this partial/total takings distinction. 10 In an effort to pre-
serve the environment in the Lake Tahoe Basin, the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA") imposed a temporary mora-
torium that prevented landowners in the region from building for
thirty-two months." The landowners contended that by denying
them all economically viable use of their property during this pe-
riod, the moratoria effectuated a taking and imposed a constitu-
tional obligation on the agency to compensate the landowners for
8. See Laurel A. Firestone, Case Comment, Temporary Moratoria and Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence After: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 287-88 (noting that under
current takings law, temporary ordinances that result in even a total economic depri-
vation of property will not be considered a compensable taking because the regula-
tion is viewed as only "temporary" in nature and thus does not deprive the owner of
all economically beneficial use).
9. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting that the purpose of
the Takings Clause is to prevent property owners from "bearing public burdens,
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
10. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. Tahoe strengthened the ad hoc approach to
regulatory takings jurisprudence by refusing to adopt a per se rule for temporary mor-
atoria. Id. at 334. Nevertheless, there are still many questions in this area of the law.
See Andrew S. Gold, The Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings and
Physical Takings, 107 DICK. L. REV. 571, 572 (2003) (noting that the Tahoe holding
"ensures continued uncertainty in takings jurisprudence" because of its reluctance "to
equate regulatory and physical government acts"); see also Firestone, supra note 8, at
287-88 (discussing the confusion that exists in certain takings situations).
11. The case involved two moratoria ordered by respondent Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency ("TRPA") to maintain the status quo while studying the impact of devel-
opment on Lake Tahoe and designing a strategy for environmentally sound growth.
The first, Ordinance 81-5, was effective from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983,
whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 83-21 was in effect from August 27,
1983, until April 25, 1984. As a result of these two directives, virtually all develop-
ment on a substantial portion of the property subject to TRPA's jurisdiction was pro-
hibited for a period of thirty-two months. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306. It should be
noted that on April 26, 1984, a new regional plan was adopted, for which the State of
California filed an action enjoining its implementation on the ground that it failed to
establish land-use controls sufficiently stringent to protect the Lake Tahoe Basin. Id.
at 312. The District Court entered an injunction that was upheld by the Ninth Circuit
and remained in effect until a revised plan was adopted in 1987. Id. Both the 1984
injunction and the 1987 plan contained provisions that prohibited new construction on
sensitive lands in the Basin. Id. The Supreme Court, however, did not consider the
validity of these provisions. Id. at 312-13.
1951
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the value of the land's use. 12 The Supreme Court held, however,
that the mere enactment of the regulations implementing the mor-
atoria did not constitute a per se taking of the landowner's prop-
erty.13 In determining whether or not the landowner was deprived
of all economic use of her land, the Court focused on the value of
the property interest as a whole.14 They concluded that because
the temporary regulation would eventually be lifted, the landowner
still retained value of her parcel and thus did not suffer a "total
deprivation" deserving of compensation.' 5 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Stevens stated that adoption of a categorical rule that
any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, consti-
tuted a compensable taking would impose unreasonable financial
obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in
processing land use applications and would improperly encourage
hasty decision-making. 6 While the Court was prudent in refusing
to adopt a per se rule for analyzing temporary takings, the contin-
ued distinction between "partial" and "total" takings is problem-
atic because it allows the government too much leeway in taking
private property without compensation.17
12. The Court limited its discussion to the claim that three actions taken by the
TRPA, Ordinance 81-5, Resolution 83-21, and the 1984 regional plan, constituted tak-
ings of the petitioners property without just compensation. Id. at 313. As noted, the
challenge to the 1.984 plan was not addressed because both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals held that it was the federal injunction against implementing that
plan, rather than the plan itself, that caused the post-1984 injuries that petitioners
allegedly suffered, and those rulings were not encompassed within their limited grant
of certiorari. Id. In 1991, petitioners amended their complaint to allege that the
adoption of the 1987 plan also constituted an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 314 n.7.
Ultimately, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that this particular
claim was barred by California's one year statute of limitations and Nevada's two year
statute of limitations. Id. The Supreme Court, however, noted that other litigants
have challenged certain applications of that plan. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 731 (1997).
13. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334 ("[T]he extreme categorical rule that any depri-
vation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable taking
surely cannot be sustained.").
14. Id. at 332.
15. Id. at 335.
16. The petitioners' broad submission would apply to numerous "normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances and the like," as
well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that vio-
late health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now foresee.
Id. Such a rule would undoubtedly require changes in practices that have long been
considered permissible exercises of the police power. Id. As Justice Holmes warned
in Pennsylvania Coal, "[G]overnment could hardly go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law. Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
17. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Comment discusses the background of regulatory
takings jurisprudence, from Justice Holmes' landmark Penn-
sylvania Coal opinion to the present, and the accompanying gray
area surrounding these decisions. Parts II and III analyze the re-
cent Tahoe decision in depth, focusing on both the strengths and
weaknesses of the decision and its potential impact on the future of
takings. Part IV offers a different analytical framework from
which to analyze regulatory takings. Under this theory, courts
would abandon the partial/total distinction, and instead focus on
the actual loss from the landowner's point of view. Courts would
apply a number of factors to guide their decision, measuring the
actual loss caused by the regulation, any reciprocal or future ad-
vantages received post-regulation, and the overall reasonableness
of the taking itself, in the context of the state's laws of property
and nuisance. Because Takings Clause issues require careful exam-
ination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances of each par-
ticular case, courts must resist the temptation to adopt per se rules
in the takings framework.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"[P]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.' 18 Also known as the "Takings Clause," the Su-
preme Court has characterized it as a "tacit recognition of a preex-
isting power" 19 of the government to achieve public ends by taking
property from private parties.2 °
The Takings Clause imposes two separate requirements on the
government:21 the property taken must serve some form of public
18. U.S. Const. amend. V.
19. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946).
20. See Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239-40 (1897)
(holding that the Takings Clause applies to the individual states through the Four-
teenth Amendment); see also Mark W. Smith, A Congressional Call to Arms: The
Time Has Come for Congress to Enforce the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, 49
OKLA. L. REV. 295, 319 (1996).
21. See Bongard, supra note 3, at 398. It should be noted that federal law is not
the only source of protection against government takings. Many states have enacted
property protection laws that may provide greater protection than the Fifth Amend-
ment. Some examples include Florida's Bert J. Harris, Jr., Property Rights Protection
Act, ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Laws 1651 (codified as amended Fla. Stat. Ann. 70.001
(West 2002)), which provides for compensation when a government action has "inor-
dinately burdened" the landowner, Fla. Stat. Ann. 70.001(2) (West 2002), and Texas's
Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act, ch. 517, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3266
(codified as amended at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 2007.001-2007.045 (Vernon 2002)),
which provides compensation when a government action results in at least a twenty-
2003] 1953
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use22 and that when a taking does occur, just compensation must be
awarded to the landowner. z3 Historically, compensation was only
required and awarded when property was actually physically
taken. 4 In 1922, however, the landmark decision in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon extended the tentacles of the Fifth Amendment to
regulatory takings.25 In that case, Justice Holmes established the
general rule that "while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if the regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a
taking. 26
At issue in Pennsylvania Coal was the Kohler Act, a statute that
prohibited the mining of coal if it would damage the structural sup-
port of "human habitations."27 The defendant coal company exe-
cuted a deed with the plaintiff homeowners in which the coal
company reserved the right to mine the coal beneath the home-
owners' property.28 The deed also released the coal company from
any liability arising from the mining of coal beneath the property.29
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that the defendant
had contract and property rights protected by the Constitution, the
court nevertheless held the statute was a legitimate exercise of po-
lice power and directed a decree for the plaintiffs.30 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the gov-
ernment regulation had gone "too far" in diminishing the value of
five percent diminution in the value of real property, Tex. Code Ann.
2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (Vernon 2002).
22. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (noting that a purely
private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement);
Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (stating that "one person's
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without justifying
a private purpose, even though compensation be paid.").
23. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
24. See Treanor, supra note 3, at 792. (recognizing that "[I]t seems to be settled
that, to entitle the owner to protection under this clause, the property must be actu-
ally taken in the physical sense of the word." (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 51920 (1857))); see also William B.
Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 601 (1972)
(noting that the dominant early approach to compensable takings was "no taking
without a touching.").
25. See Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
26. Id. at 416 (noting that the "[S]trong public desire to improve the public condi-
tion is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu-
tional way of paying for the change.").
27. Id. at 412-13.
28. Id. at 412.
29. Id.
30. Id.
1954
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the coal company's property, and thus compensation was
required.3'
Pennsylvania Coal was revolutionary not only because it applied
the Fifth Amendment to regulatory takings for the first time, but
also because it articulated the central conflict that would come to
dominate regulatory takings jurisprudence: the preservation of in-
dividual property rights versus the deference given to legislatures
in protecting "public health, safety and welfare. '32 In particular,
Justice Holmes focused on the diminution in property value caused
by the regulation, which has become one of the factors courts use
in determining compensation.33
Holmes opinion was clear in two respects. First, regulatory tak-
ings challenges should be determined on a case-by-case basis.34
Second, there is an implied limitation of property ownership that
will yield to the legislature's police power. 35 Thus, the Court re-
peatedly has recognized the ability of government, in certain cir-
31. Id. at 414 (noting that "[t]he act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the
police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places
where the right to mine such coal has been reserved.").
32. Id. at 413.
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limita-
tion and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limita-
tion must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the
dimunition. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain
the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts. The greatest
weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to
interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its consti-
tutional power.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (noting that the question of whether or not a regulation has gone "too far"
depends on the facts of the particular case).
35. Id.; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. Debenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
491-92 (1987).
Long ago it was recognized that all property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the
community, and the Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one
that requires compensation when the State asserts its power to enforce it.
Id. Thus the court has frequently upheld regulations imposed to arrest a significant
threat to the common welfare, whatever their economic effect on the owner. See, e.g.,
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ("Although a comparison of values
before and after is relevant, it is by no means conclusive."); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S.
603, 608 (1927); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
2003] 1955
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cumstances, to regulate property without compensation, no matter
how adverse the financial effect on the owner.36
A. The Next Step: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City-Providing the Analytical Framework for
Regulatory Takings
The Supreme Court established the analytical framework for de-
termining whether regulations go "too far" in the landmark case of
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.37 In that
case, the New York City Land Preservation Commission failed to
approve plans for construction of a fifty-story office building above
the Grand Central Station terminal.38 Since Grand Central Station
had been designated a landmark, the owners had to obtain permis-
sion from the Land Preservation Commission before they could
"alter the architectural features of the landmark or construct any
exterior improvement on the landmark site."' 39 This was to ensure
36. "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared,
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property." See
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668 (upholding an ordinance that prohibited operation of a previ-
ously lawful brewery, although the establishment was deemed to have lost all value as
property); see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment did not require Virginia to pay compensation to the owner of cedar trees
ordered destroyed to prevent a disease from spreading to nearby apple orchards);
Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923) (stating that "de-
struction of, or injury to, property is frequently accomplished without a taking in the
constitutional sense."); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 682 (1888) (upholding
legislation prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine, despite the owner's allega-
tion that the entire value of his property would be lost and he would be deprived of
his livelihood).
37. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
38. Id. at 115-16.
39. There were three separate procedures available through which administrative
approval could be obtained if an owner wished to alter a landmark site. First, the
owner could apply to the Commission for an order approving the improvement or
alteration on the grounds that it would not change or affect any architectural feature
of the landmark. Denial of that certificate was subject to judicial review. Id. at 112.
Second, the owner could apply to the Commission for a certificate of "appropriate-
ness." Id. These certificates were granted if the Commission concluded that the pro-
posed construction on the landmark site would not unduly hinder the protection,
enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the landmark from an aesthetic, historical and
architectural perspective. Id. Again, the denial of this certificate was subject to judi-
cial review. Moreover, if the owner was denied either a certificate of no exterior
effect or a certificate of appropriateness, they could submit an alternative or modified
plan for approval. Id. The final procedure available, obtaining a certificate of appro-
priateness on the ground of insufficient return, provided special mechanisms which
varied depending on whether or not the landmark was tax exempt, to ensure that the
designation did not cause economic hardship. Id.
1956
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that "decisions concerning construction on the landmark site" were
made with due consideration of both the public interest in the
maintenance of the structure and the landowner's interest in the
use of the property.40 Following Holmes's lead in Pennsylvania
Coal, the Court embraced the position that physical possession was
not necessary for a taking,4" and recognized that determining
whether or not a regulation constituted a taking depended largely
on the "particular circumstances of the case. "42
Penn Central is an important decision because it outlined a bal-
ancing test consisting of three factors to be used in evaluating the
constitutionality of a government regulation: 1) the economic im-
pact of the regulation on the claimant;43 2) the extent to which the
regulation interfered with the landowners "reasonable investment
backed expectations; ' 44 and 3) the overall character of the govern-
ment action.45 The Supreme Court acknowledged that in balancing
these factors, courts are deciding regulatory takings cases by "es-
sentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. "46 Applying these factors, the
Court found the regulation imposed on the Grand Central Station
"41owners had not gone "too far".
40. Id.
41. Id. at 122-23 ("As is implicit in our opinion, we do not embrace the proposi-
tion that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physical con-
trol over a portion of the parcel.").
42. See id. at 124 (recognizing that "[t]his court, quite simply has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." (citing Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962))); see also United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (noting that courts have frequently observed that
whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to
pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely upon the particular cir-
cumstances of that case).
43. The court noted that although the designation of a landmark and landmark
site restricted the owner's control over the parcel, this designation also enhanced the
economic position of the landmark's owner in a significant respect. Penn. Cent.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 113-114. Under New York City's zoning laws at that time,
owners of real property who were unable to develop their property to the full extent
permitted by the applicable zoning laws were allowed to these "restricted" develop-
ment rights to contiguous parcels on the same city block, where they normally would
not have been able to build. Id.
44. Id. at 124.
45. In engaging these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are relevant considera-
tions. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594).
46. Id. 438 U.S. at 130-31.
47. Id.
1957
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First, the Court noted that the regulation was substantially re-
lated to the promotion of general welfare, and served a legitimate
societal interest.48 In their view, New York City had a vested inter-
est in structures and areas with special historic, aesthetic, and cul-
tural significance, and preserving this was a permissible goal.49
Second, the Court focused on the severity of the impact of the reg-
ulation on the investment backed expectations regarding the appel-
lant's parcel.50 Because the New York City law did not interfere
with how the Terminal was presently used,51 and the landowners
still retained the ability to develop their airspace over other build-
ings in the city,52 the disturbance of the property was not of "such a
magnitude that there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain it."53
48. In instances where a "legislature has reasonably concluded that health, morals,
or general welfare would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of
land, Courts have upheld land use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected
recognized real property interests." Id. at 105. Zoning laws are a classic example of
this, and have been viewed as a permissible government action even when prohibiting
the most beneficial use of property. See East Lake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S.
668, 674 (1976); Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1926) (allowing
zoning laws which prohibited industrial use).
49. States and cities may enact land use restrictions or controls to enhance the
quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city.
See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1974).
50. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 136.
51. Id.
Its designation as a landmark not only permits, but contemplates that appel-
lants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the
past sixty-five years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and con-
cessions. So the law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn
Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.
Id.
52. Id. at 137.
[T]o the extent the appellants have been denied the right to build above the
Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied all use
of even those pre-existing air rights. Their ability to use these rights have
not been abrogated; they are made transferable to at least eight parcels in
the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have been found suitable
for the construction of new office buildings. Although appellants and others
have argued that New York City's transferable development rights program
is far from ideal, the New York courts here supportably found that, at least
in the case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While these
rights may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking' had
occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial
burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be
taken into account in considering the impact of the regulation.
Id.
53. Id. at 136. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
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The most influential aspect of Penn Central's holding, however,
was its admonition to focus on the landowner's property interest as
a whole, which essentially divided regulatory takings into two cate-
gories-partial and total.54 The appellants urged that because the
Landmarks law had deprived them of any gainful use of the air
rights above the Terminal, a taking had occurred, entitling them to
compensation regardless of the value of the remainder of their par-
cel.5 1 The Court found this argument "untenable," instead focus-
ing on the nature and extent of the government's interference with
the "parcel as a whole. '56 Under this analysis, the appellants'
property still retained significant value because it was operating as
a train station, its primary purpose. Even though the landowner
was being deprived of use of her air rights, and had sustained a
significant economic loss, the Court reasoned that the remaining
property could still be put to productive use. In other words, be-
cause the regulation had only caused a partial loss to the land-
owner, it did not constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment. This reasoning spawned the movement toward dis-
tinguishing between "partial" and "total" regulatory takings.
Under current case law, takings that fit the Penn Central mold are
considered "partial" and analyzed under the balancing test the
Court laid out in that decision. 7
B. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Introducing
Total Takings
Unlike partial regulatory takings, courts have distinguished a
"total" regulatory taking as one that completely deprives a land-
54. See id. at 130-131.
55. "This court has previously held that the 'air rights' over an area of land are
'property' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 143 (citing United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (a landowners air rights taken by low flying planes was
deserving of compensation)); see also Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1922) (firing of projectiles over summer resort
can constitute taking).
56. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130.
Taking[s] jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete seg-
ments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental ac-
tion has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole-here, the city tax block designated as the 'landmark site.'
Id.
57. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 331 (2002) (noting that Penn Central is the proper framework for partial regula-
tory takings).
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owner of all economically viable use of his property.58 The frame-
work for this analysis was illustrated in the 1992 decision Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.59 In Lucas, the claimant pur-
chased two residential lots for $975,000, only to have them ren-
dered "valueless" by a statue enacted two years later.6" Lucas filed
suit, claiming a taking under the Fifth Amendment.61 The trial
court found that a taking had occurred and ordered compensation
of $1,232,387.50, representing the value of the property, plus inter-
est.6 2 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the regulation was proscribed to prevent serious public harm and
thus did not constitute a compensable taking, irrespective of the
regulation's effect on the property's value.63 The Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's decision, establishing the categorical rule
that when a regulation deprives an owner of all economically bene-
ficial uses of her land, she has suffered a taking and deserves
compensation.64
Under this rule, a statute or governmental action that wholly
eliminates the value of a fee simple title clearly qualifies as a tak-ing.65 Tus, Lucas established the rule that if there is a "total" tak-
ing, the landowner is due complete compensation,66 but if there is
only a "partial taking," courts must use the Penn Central balancing
approaching.67
This is significant because takings claims under the Penn Central
analysis typically fall short of compensation. 8 The Supreme Court
has only once found a taking compensable under the partial tak-
ings analysis,69 and will generally deny compensation as long as the
58. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that
when the government forces a landowner to give up "all economically beneficial
uses .... [of his property], he has suffered a taking").
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1006-07.
61. Id. at 1009.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1010.
64. Id. at 1027.
65. Id. at 1030.
66. Id. at 1016-17.
67. Id. at 1015-16.
68. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled
Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1377-78 (1993) (stating that partial tak-
ings, while virtually total in form, will remain uncompensated under the Court's cur-
rent approach); see also Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 886 (D. C. Cir.
1999) (Williams, J., concurring) (noting that "in partial takings cases, the government
wins").
69. See E. Enter. v. Apfel, 525 U.S. 498, 529-30 (1998).
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regulation "substantially furthers a legitimate state interest. ' 70 As
more than one commentator has noted, this partial/total distinction
has made it increasingly difficult for a landowner to prove a com-
pensable taking.7'
C. The Importance of the Nuisance Exception
Every takings claim is subject to what is known as the "nuisance
exception. ' 72 Since the beginning of our regulatory takings juris-
prudence, courts have recognized that property rights "are enjoyed
under an implied limitation. ' 73 This is crucial, because if a regula-
tion on the use of property "inheres in the title itself, in the restric-
tions that background principles of the State's law of property and
nuisance already placed upon land ownership," there will be no
taking, regardless of the economic effect on the owner.7 1 It is im-
portant to note that these "background principles" cannot be
newly legislated.7 5 They must be a long-standing part of the state's
property law, such as restrictions on using property as a common
law nuisance. 76 Thus, while analyzing takings challenges involves
the consideration of a multitude of factors, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly acknowledged that a claim must first pass this initial in-
quiry of the nuisance exception.77
D. The Emergence of Conceptual Severance: Breaking Up Is
Hard To Do
Traditionally, landowners' property rights have consisted of
three different components: the right to possession (including the
right to exclude others78), use, and disposition. 79 The Supreme
70. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
71. See Dist. Intown Props. Ltd., 198 F.3d at 886 (Williams, J., concurring) (stating
that "few regulations will flunk this nearly vacuous test"); see also Epstein, supra note
68, at 1376-77 (stating that "this approach invites the form of governmental abuse the
Bill of Rights was designed to protect").
72. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (noting that "[a]s long recog-
nized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power").
73. Id. at 413.
74. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
351 (2002) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
76. Id.
77. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 351; Lucas, 505 U.S at 1027-28.
78. The right to exclude others is "universally held to be a fundamental element"
of one's property rights. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979):
Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
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Court has recognized these basic elements stating that property
rights are not limited to the "physical thing" but instead "denote
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical
thing, as the right to possess, use, and dispose of it. ' '80
Determining the "property interest" at stake in takings claims,
however, has been a continuing challenge.8 Courts have often
splintered property interests into spatial, functional, temporal, and
economic units to determine whether a government action has re-
sulted in the taking of private property without just compensa-
tion.82 This process, known as conceptual severance, is an abstract
treatment of property that allows any one of the classic property
rights to be fragmented, no matter how small, and held up by the
owner as constituting its own distinct property right.83 This theory
is important because it conflicts directly with the partial/total
ing) ("[A]n essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others
from enjoying it."). The right to possession includes the right to exclude others from
one's land. The Supreme Court has classified the right to exclude as "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized a property."
Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
79. See Margaret Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1668 (1988) ("[T]he conception of
property includes the exclusive rights of possession, use, and disposition." (quoting
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 304 (1985))).
80. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
81. See Radin, supra note 79, at 1671 ("Unlike Richard Epstein, our Supreme
Court has not fully constitutionalized (that is, found 'in' the Constitution) the classical
liberal conception of property.").
82. This splintering of the whole fee simple into separate interests is known as
conceptual severance, a term first coined by Radin, supra note 79 at 1676:
It consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just what the gov-
ernment action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that
particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus, this strategy hy-
pothetically or conceptually 'severs' from the whole bundle of rights just
those strands that are interfered with by the regulation, and then hypotheti-
cally or conceptually construes those strands in the aggregate as a separate
whole thing.
Id. For examples of these various forms of conceptual severance and how they have
been applied by courts throughout the years, see Tedra Fox, Annual Review of Envi-
ronmental and Natural Resources Law: Land Use Law Takings, Lake Tahoe's Tempo-
rary Development Moratorium: Why a Stitch in Time Should Not Define the Property
Interest in a Takings Claim, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 399, 400 n.2 (2001) and Marc Lisker,
Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663, 696-702
(1996) (discussing various ways courts have interpreted property interests).
83. See Radin, supra note 79, at 1676; see also Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual
Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 592-93 (2000)
("Conceptual severance for the purpose of Takings Clause cases views any concep-
tually distinct aspect of a person's property as a separate strand within the bundle of
rights-as property itself.").
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framework of Penn Central's holding. Instead of focusing on the
regulation's impact on the parcel as a whole, conceptual severance
separates the land directly affected by the regulation from the un-
affected portions. 84 For instance, suppose a regulation completely
deprived a landowner of seventy-five percent of his property. Us-
ing conceptual severance, a court would ignore the remaining
twenty-five percent of the property that is unaffected and only fo-
cus on the sections rendered unusable by the regulation; thus con-
cluding that the landowner had lost one hundred percent of the
value of his land. Under the Penn Central analysis, this same piece
of property would be analyzed differently. Using that framework,
a court would focus on the value of the land in its entirety, and
conclude that because a quarter of the land is unaffected, the land
is not deprived of all economically beneficial use.
While the Supreme Court has seemingly applied conceptual sev-
erance in several decisions, this line of reasoning is not without
fault.8 5 Several commentators have noted that conceptual sever-
ance is ambiguous, and views property in a vacuum, disregarding
the future economic value of property, a key factor in measuring
the extent of the loss the landowner has faced.86
84. Radin, supra note 79, at 1676.
85. Compare Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979) (holding
that the government's imposition of a public boating easement connecting a private
marina to the ocean was a taking based on the principle that it violated the "right to
exclude," a fundamental stick in the landowners bundle of rights), and Hodel v. Ir-
ving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987) (finding that a federal regulation affecting the right
to dispose of property via intestacy or devise violated the Takings Clause), with Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 (1980) (noting that because the plaintiffs were
able to sell or develop their property after the condemnation period ended, the entire
bundle of sticks was not affected, and the government action was thus not a taking in
the constitutional sense), and Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (using the
"parcel as a whole rule to explain why a regulation impacting the right to sell eagle
feathers would be viewed as a taking in its entirety, because it only affected 'one
strand' of the plaintiffs bundle of rights").
86. See Firestone, supra note 8, at 286 (describing conceptual severance as "ambig-
uous" and emphasizing the importance of the future value of one's property in regula-
tory takings analysis); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Ass'n, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) ("With property so divided, every delay
would become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process alike would
constitute categorical takings."); Carla Boyd, Comment, Temporal Severance and the
Exclusion of Time in Determining the Economic Value of Regulated Property, 36
U.S.F.L. REV. 793, 820 (2002) ("Allowing temporal severance and looking at property
in a vacuum could have serious implications.").
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E. Temporal Severance: Opening the Door to the
Tahoe Debate
Temporal severance, by comparison, is a form of conceptual sev-
erance used to examine the impact of a temporary regulation, simi-
lar to the moratorium at issue in Tahoe.87 Instead of viewing the
entire duration of the regulation, temporal severance examines
whether a regulation constitutes a "total taking" over a specific pe-
riod of time.88 Thus to prove a total taking under this framework, a
landowner must show that her property interest was rendered val-
ueless for a certain period of time, regardless of the value of the
land after the regulation.89 This is problematic because a fee sim-
ple estate cannot be deprived of all value by a temporary prohibi-
tion on economic use in that the property will recover value as
soon as the restriction is lifted.90
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's holding in First English Ev-
angelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,91 has been
interpreted by some as applying temporal severance to temporary
takings.92 In that case, the government enacted a regulation
prohibiting construction in an area that had been subject to exten-
sive flooding and damage.93 The government later repealed the
ban on development, and the landowners brought a takings action,
alleging the ordinance denied them all economically viable use of
their land.94 The Supreme Court addressed the limited question of
whether the county's repeal of the ordinance would be a sufficient
remedy if the ordinance was found to violate the Takings Clause.95
87. See Boyd, supra note 86, at 793-94.
88. Id.
89. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331 ("Petitioners seek to bring this case ... by
arguing that we can effectively sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each
landowner's fee simple estate, and then asking whether that segment has been taken
in its entirety by the moratoria.").
90. Id. at 1484.
91. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
92. For a discussion of the various interpretations of First English, see Boyd, supra
note 86, at 817-20. See also Brief for Petitioner at 29, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Ass'n, TSPC III, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001) (No. 00-1.167) ("[S]urely
the Court would not have addressed the issue in First English if it believed that the
underlying substantive claim could not result in a Fifth Amendment taking as a matter
of law.").
93. First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
94. Id. at 311-12.
95. The majority concluded that an invalidation of an ordinance or its successor
ordinance after a period of time, though converting the taking into a "temporary"
one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Takings Clause. Id. at 319.
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The majority concluded that "temporary takings that deny a land-
owner all use of her property are no different than permanent
ones, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.
96
First English's holding is important because there has been consid-
erable debate over whether the Court implicitly condoned the ap-
plication of temporal severance in temporary takings analysis.97
Nevertheless, this language may have fueled the Tahoe controversy
by sending the message that development moratoriums are fair
game for "temporary takings" attacks. 9
This influence was at the heart of Tahoe, because in order to
prove a total taking had occurred, the petitioners had to "tempo-
rally sever" the thirty-two month segment from which their land
was affected by the temporary moratoria, and separate it from the
remainder of the landowner's fee simple.99 Thus in Tahoe, the
landowners urged the Supreme Court to adopt a categorical rule
that any temporary moratorium that deprives a landowner of all
economic use is a compensable taking.10
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN TAHOE
A. Tahoe-Behind the Scenes
Lake Tahoe, one of the most beautiful natural settings in the
United States, has been approaching an environmental breaking
point since the 1960s.101 Its exceptional clarity and pristine blue
waters are a result of the absence of algae that obscures the waters
96. Id. at 318.
97. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1619 (1988)
(noting that in his dissenting opinion in First English, Justice Stevens feared that the
"majority unambiguously bought into the general doctrine of conceptual severance by
time shares"); Fox, supra note 82, at 423 ("Conceptual severance is too susceptible to
manipulation to achieve fairness consistently, can actually thwart efficient distribution
of resources, and is incompatible with the evolution of sustainable and sound land use
practices."); Boyd, supra note 86, at 805 (citing Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation for
Permanent Takings of Temporal Interests, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 485 (2001) (arguing that
compensation must be provided for a temporary development moratorium)).
98. See Fox, supra note 82, at 409. This is despite the fact that the Court stated
that the state's authority to enact safety regulations may insulate the ordinance from a
takings finding. Id. On remand, the lower court found that the ordinance 'advanced
the preeminent state interest in public safety and did not deny the appellant all use of
its property.' Id. at n.51. The court reasoned that the pre-existing use of the land
could continue because camping activities could still be conducted on the property.
Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 210 Cal.
App. 3d. 1353, 1356 (1989)).
99. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Ass'n, 535 U.S. 302,
331-32 (2002).
100. Id. at 307.
101. Id.
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of most other lakes.1"2 Historically, the lack of nitrogen and phos-
phorous, which nourish the growth of algae, has ensured the trans-
parency of its waters." 3 An influx of residences, casinos, resorts,
and other development in the area, however, eventually replaced
the native vegetation with impervious surfaces. °4 This "impervi-
ous coverage," such as asphalt, concrete, buildings, and even
packed dirt, prevents precipitation from being absorbed by the
soil) 0 5 As a result, water is gathered and concentrated in larger
amounts, which has led to increased surface run-off, flooding, and
soil erosion.06 Lake Tahoe was fed a steady diet of nitrogen and
phosphorous, which in turn had a distinct affect on the lake's fa-
mous clarity.10 7 Given this trend, the District Court predicted that
"unless the process is stopped, the lake will lose clarity and its
trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for eternity."10 8
The areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes produce more
runoff, and therefore are usually considered "high hazard" lands." 9
Moreover, certain areas near streams or wetlands, known as
"Stream Environment Zones" ("SEZs") are especially vulnerable
to the impact of the development because, in their natural state,
they act as filters for much of the debris that runoff carries.110 Be-
cause the best way to alleviate this problem is to restrict or prevent
development around the lake, particularly in areas already natu-
rally prone to runoff, conservation efforts have focused on control-
ling growth in these highly sensitive areas."'
In the 1960s, the legislatures of Nevada and California adopted
the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, 1 2 which set goals for the
102. Id.
103. According to a Senate Report:
Only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable quality-Crater
Lake in Oregon, which is protected as part of the Crater Lake National
Park, and Lake Baikal in the former Soviet Union. Only Lake Tahoe, how-
ever, is so readily accessibly from large metropolitan centers and is so adapt-
able to urban development.
Id. at n.2.
104. Id. at 308.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The District Court there also added: "Or at least, for a very, very long
time. Estimates are that, should the lake turn green, it could take over 700 years for it
to return to its natural state, if that were ever possible at all." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 309.
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protection and preservation of the lake and created the Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Association ("TRPA"), "to coordinate and regu-
late development in the Basin and to conserve its natural
resources."'1 3 Over the years, the state legislatures amended the
compact's conservation plan several times.'1 4
The two moratoria at issue in Tahoe were adopted by the TRPA
to maintain the status quo while studying the impact of develop-
ment on Lake Tahoe, and design a strategy for environmentally
sound growth."' 5 The first, Ordinance 81-5, was effective from Au-
gust 24, 1981 to August 26, 1983. The second, more restrictive Res-
olution 83-21 was in effect from August 27, 1983 to April 25,
1984.116 As a result of these two directives, virtually all develop-
ment on a substantial portion of the property subject to the
TRPA's jurisdiction was prohibited for a period of thirty-two
months. 17 The petitioners, real estate owners affected by the mor-
atoria, filed parallel suits, later consolidated, claiming that the
TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just
compensation." 8 Following the partial/total framework for regula-
tory takings, the District Court concluded that the TRPA's morato-
ria had not effectuated a "partial taking" under Penn Central
analysis, 11 9 but did constitute a "total taking" under the categorical
rule announced in Lucas,120 because the TRPA temporarily de-
113. See id. (quoting Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391, 394 (1979)).
114. For a general discussion of this, see Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309-14.
115. Id. at 306.
116. Id. For a brief overview of these moratoria, see supra notes 11-12 and accom-
panying text.
117. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306.
118. Id. at 312.
119. The District Court began its constitutional analysis by identifying the distinc-
tion between a direct government appropriation of property without just compensa-
tion and a government regulation that imposes such a severe restriction on the
owner's use of property that it produces "nearly the same result s a direct appropria-
tion." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.
2d 1226, 1238 (Nev. 1999). It then stated that a "regulation will constitute a taking
when either: 1) it does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest; or 2) it
denies the owner economically viable use of her land." Id. at 1239. The District
Court rejected the first alternative, finding that "further development on high hazard
lands such as the petitioners would lead to significant additional damage to the lake."
Id. at 1240. With respect to the second alternative, the court first considered whether
the analysis adopted in Penn Central would lead to the conclusion that the TRPA had
effected a "partial taking," and then whether those actions effected a "total taking."
Id. at 1240. Under this analysis, it found a taking had not occurred. Id.
120. The District Court concluded that because the moratoria had denied the land-
owner of "all economically viable use" for a period of time, it was a total taking under
the Lucas rule. Id. at 1245.
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prived petitioners of all economically viable use of their land.'21
The Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the District Court's "total takings" analysis was incorrect in that
the "temporary" regulation did not deprive the landowner of "all
economically viable use" of his property.122 The Ninth Circuit
noted that because the regulation was only temporary in nature,
the moratoria only partially affected the petitioner's property in-
terest, and thus did not meet the "total" deprivation of value re-
quired to constitute a categorical taking under Lucas. 123 The Ninth
Circuit thus rejected the petitioner's argument of conceptually sev-
ering the property interest into temporal segments, instead focus-
ing on the impact of the moratoria on the value of the parcel as a
whole. 24 Because of the importance of the case, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, limiting the question to whether a mora-
torium on development, imposed during the process of devising a
comprehensive land-use plan, constitutes a categorical taking of
property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause. 25
B. The Tahoe Court's Decision
1. Refusal to Adopt a Categorical Rule for Temporary Takings
The first aspect of the Supreme Court's holding was its refusal to
adopt the categorical, per se rule that any deprivation of all eco-
121. Although the court was satisfied that the petitioner's property did retain some
value during the moratoria, it found that they had been temporarily deprived of "all
economically viable use of their land." Id. at 1245. The court thus concluded that
those actions therefore constituted "categorical" takings under the Lucas decision.
Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that a
regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of his property
must receive compensation)).
122. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,
774 (9th Cir. 2000).
123. Id.
124. Property interests may have many different dimensions. For example, a prop-
erty interest may include a physical dimension (which describes the size and shape of
the property in question), a functional dimension (which describes the extent to which
an owner may use or dispose of the property in question), and a temporal dimension
(which describes the duration of the property interest). At the base, the plaintiff's
argument is that we should conceptually sever each plaintiff's fee interest into discrete
segments in at least one of these dimensions, the temporal one, and treat each of
those segments as separate and distinct property interests for purposes of takings
analysis. Id. Under this theory, they argue that there was a categorical taking of one
of those temporal segments. Id. Putting to one side "cases of physical invasion or
occupation," the court read the cases involving regulatory taking claims to focus on
the impact of the regulation on the parcel as a whole. Id. at 776.
125. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
306 (2002).
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nomic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a compensable tak-
ing. 126 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that since
the petitioners only made a facial attack on the moratorium, 27
they faced an "uphill battle' 28 made especially steep by their de-
sire for a categorical rule requiring compensation whenever the
government imposes such a moratorium on development.
29
This is noteworthy for several reasons. First, acceptance of the
petitioners' categorical rule would diminish the importance of fac-
tors such as the landowners' reasonable investment backed expec-
tations, the actual impact of the regulation on the individual, the
importance of the public interest served by the regulation, and the
reasons for imposing the temporary restriction, all of which are
critical in determining the affect of the regulation on the
landowner.
Second, acceptance of an extreme and narrow categorical rule
would severely hinder the government in its ability to employ tem-
porary land use procedures that are necessary to regulate the pub-
lic's "health, safety, and welfare."'130  Such a rule would
undoubtedly restrict or alter the legislature's ability to exercise po-
lice power in certain instances. As Justice Holmes warned in Penn-
sylvania Coal, "[G]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law." 1
31
Third, categorical rules, when applied to regulatory takings, only
serve to create ambiguity and confusion. Land use regulations are
ubiquitous and most impact property values in some tangential,
126. Id. at 334.
127. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
For the petitioners, it is enough that a regulation imposes a temporary depri-
vation-no matter how brief-of all economically viable use to trigger a per
se rule that a taking has occurred. Petitioners assert that our opinions in
First English and Lucas have already endorsed their view, and that it is a
logical application of the principle that the Takings Clause was 'designed to
bar government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.'
Id.
128. Id. at 320 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 495 (1987)).
129. Id. at 320.
130. Id. at 334-35 ("Petitioners' broad submission would apply to numerous normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the
like, as well as to order temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that
violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we cannot now
foresee.").
131. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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completely unanticipated way.132 They are more difficult to define
than physical takings, which are relatively rare and easily identi-
fied. 133 Treating them all as per se takings would "transform gov-
ernment regulation into a luxury few governments could afford,"
and severely inhibit the ability of legislatures to exercise police
power in permissible situations.3 Thus, when analyzing regula-
tory takings, the Tahoe Court was prudent in following Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Palazollo v. Rhode Island,1 35 in which
she urged the Court to resist the "temptation to adopt what
amounts to per se rules in either direction" and "carefully examine
and weigh all of the relevant circumstances" in making their
decision. 136
2. Tahoe's Rejection of Conceptual Severance
Another key aspect of the Tahoe holding was the Supreme
Court's rejection of conceptual severance. 37 The theory of con-
ceptual severance was at the heart of the Tahoe controversy, be-
cause in order to prove a categorical taking, the plaintiffs needed
to demonstrate that the thirty-two month development morato-
rium denied "all beneficial or productive use" of their land.1 38
They urged the Court to temporally sever this thirty-two month
segment from the remainder of each landowner's fee simple estate,
and then ask whether that segment has been deprived of all value
by the moratoria.139
132. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331.
Petitioners seek to bring the case under the rule announced in Lucas by
arguing that we can effectively sever a thirty-two month segment from the
remainder of each landowner's fee simple estate, and then ask whether that
segment has been taken in its entirety by the moratoria. Of course, defining
the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation being challenged
is circular. With property so divided, every delay would become a total ban;
the moratorium and the normal permit process alike would constitute cate-
gorical takings.
Id.
138. To prove a per se, categorical taking, the plaintiff must show: 1) he has suf-
fered a permanent physical occupation of his property as the result of government
action; or 2) he has been denied "all economically beneficial or productive use of his
land." See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coast Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
139. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331.
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This form of conceptual severance is problematic in two ways.
First, to make this determination, one must calculate the propor-
tion of the plaintiff's property that the moratorium affects, and
then compare the property's value after the regulation (the numer-
ator) with its value before the regulation (the denominator). 4 °
Courts have routinely wrestled with this test 141 because if the de-
nominator is defined broadly enough, a taking may never result.
If, however, it is defined narrowly, a taking almost always will be
found.1 42 The Court's decisions in Pennsylvania Coal143 and Key-
stone Bituminous144 provide a vivid illustration of how the identity
of the denominator can tilt the wheels of takings law towards a
particular outcome. Both cases involved challenges of a Penn-
sylvania law that prevented the removal of coal from underground
"support estates" as a legitimate regulatory exercise of health,
safety, and welfare. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court appeared to
have viewed the support estate as both the numerator and denomi-
nator in the takings equation, thus finding a compensable taking. 145
In Keystone, however, the Court seemed to enlarge the denomina-
tor to include the company's mineral, surface, and support estates,
and found that no taking had occurred. 146 Thus identifying the rel-
evant parcel is crucial in regulatory takings analysis. Because the
Tahoe Court focused on the aggregate of the landowner's parcel,
rather than just a slice of the fee simple, they may have sparked the
movement toward identifying all of the landowner's holdings as the
relevant parcel in takings cases.
140. See Lisker, supra note 82, at 666 (discussing the struggles courts have had in
determining the relevant denominator in Takings claims).
141. As Justice Scalia observed in Lucas, the rule does not make clear the "prop-
erty interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured. Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1016. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave ninety percent of
a rural tract in its natural state, it is "unclear whether we would analyze the situation
as one which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the
burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere
diminution in the value of the tract as a whole." Id. at 1016.
142. See id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 393 (1922).
144. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 470 (1987).
145. Pa Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
146. The petitioners in Keystone "sought to narrowly define certain segments of
their property" by contending that the support estate had been taken. Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 496-97. The Court viewed the support estate as
"merely a part of the entire bundle of rights" and concluded that there was no taking
because "petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all of the coal in their mineral
estates." Id. at 501.
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Second, conceptual severance focuses only on the present value
of the property, and ignores any future value the property may
have. This future economic value is crucial in determining both the
present value of one's property,147 and the actual loss the land-
owner has sustained as a result of the regulation. For instance, if a
temporary regulation significantly increases the value of the land
post-regulation, the harm done to the landowner is minimized.
Tahoe's holding is important because it signals a possible move-
ment towards defining property in this context-by viewing all of
the landowner's property interests as compromising the denomina-
tor in takings cases.' 48 The Court reasoned that the moratoria had
only affected a small portion of the landowner's property inter-
est-the temporal one-and held that the Lucas rule of "complete
obliteration of value of the parcel" did not apply. 149 By focusing
on both the present and the future value of a fee simple estate, the
Tahoe Court recognized that a landowner's loss must be viewed in
its entirety, and not by conceptual severance.' 50
III. PROBLEMS WITH TAHOE
A. The Dilemma of Partial/Total Takings Analysis
In Tahoe, the Supreme Court noted that had the petitioners chal-
lenged their takings claim in a different fashion, they may have
prevailed.' 5' Rather than challenging the application of the mora-
toria on their individual parcels of land, the petitioners made a
broad facial challenge, claiming a categorical total taking.152 The
Court viewed their proposed categorical rule as simply "too blunt
an instrument" to decide regulatory takings claims.' 53 Because the
147. See Boyd, supra note 86, at 805 ("In order to determine the present economic
value of property, the future value is an essential element.").
148. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Ass'n, 535 U.S.
302, 329-32 (2002).
149. Id. at 330 ("[O]ur holding in Lucas was limited to the extraordinary circum-
stances when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted." (cit-
ing Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992))).
150. Id. at 331-32 ("An interest in real property is defined in metes and bounds that
describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal
aspect of the owner's interest. Both dimensions must be considered if the interest is
to be viewed in its entirety." (citation omitted)).
151. Id. at 321 n.16 ("It may be true that under a Penn Central analysis petitioners'
land was taken and compensation would be due. But petitioners failed to challenge
the District Court's conclusion that there was no taking under Penn Central.")
152. Id. at 317-18.
153. Id. at 342 ("There may be moratoria that last longer than one year which inter-
fere with reasonable investment-backed expectations, but as the District Court opin-
ion illustrates, the petitioners' proposed rule is "too blunt an instrument" for
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petitioners limited their challenge to a broad facial takings claim,
the court only looked at the "mere enactment of the regulation"
and not its application to any particular plaintiff.154 Accordingly,
the Court held that the circumstances of the case were best ana-
lyzed within the partial takings framework, rather than the total
taking that the petitioners sought to prove. 155 Thus, Tahoe contin-
ued to perpetuate the distinction between partial and total takings.
This partial/total analysis has been used by courts to explain the
difference between regulations that leave landowners with some
use of their property and those that leave land with no use at all.
Governmental entities commonly use this dichotomy as a defense
to takings claims because, as noted, under current case law most
regulations will fall short of depriving landowners all use of their
property. 156  This distinction is problematic for a number of
reasons.
First, under this analysis, a landowner whose property is ninety-
five percent diminished in value will likely recover nothing, while
an owner whose property is one hundred percent diminished re-
covers the land's full value. 57 As noted, the Supreme Court rarely
finds a taking compensable under the partial takings analysis, and
will generally deny compensation as long as the regulation furthers
a legitimate governmental goal. 158 For example, a partial taking on
property resulting in multi-million dollar loss may result in no com-
pensation, whereas a total taking on land resulting in only a mini-
mal loss of value to the property owner will result in complete
compensation. This can lead to the anomalous situation where a
"partial" taking, for which the landowner does not receive com-
pensation, results in a much greater monetary loss than another
landowner's "total" compensable taking.15 9
identifying those cases." (quoting Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628
(2001))).
154. Id. at 318 ("Moreover, because petitioners brought only a facial challenge, the
narrow inquiry before the Court of Appeals was whether the mere enactment of the
regulations constituted a taking.").
155. Id. at 321 ("Resisting the 'temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in
either direction,' we conclude that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed
within the Penn Central framework." (quoting Palazollo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor,
J., concurring))).
156. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992) (noting that it is
'relatively rare' that a total taking is found); see also supra notes 68-71 and accompa-
nying text.
157. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
159. Bongard, supra note 3, at 403 (criticizing this partial/total dichotomy).
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Yet another problem with this distinction is that the Fifth
Amendment does not distinguish between partial and total takings.
The text explicitly states that what is taken must be compen-
sated.160 Thus the analytical framework may be at odds with prece-
dent, because the Supreme Court has, on many occasions, fully
compensated partial takings to the extent of the value taken from
their land.' 61 While many of these takings were physical in nature,
it seems troublesome to distinguish these from partial regulatory
takings because a restriction on the use of one's land often has the
same effect as an actual physical invasion. From the landowner's
standpoint, there is no difference between a physical invasion that
occupies part of her property or a regulation that partially deprives
her of its use. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Causby, "[I]t is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the
measure of the value of property taken. 162
Finally, many view this partial/total distinction as an invitation
for the government to take property without paying compensa-
tion. 63 With the state of current regulatory takings framework, it
is unlikely that any legislature will impose a regulation that encom-
passes all of a landowner's property, when they can regulate the
majority of someone's property and probably not have to pay com-
pensation. As Professor Richard Epstein has noted, "[T]he court
has provided an effective blueprint for confiscation that budget-
conscious state legislators will be eager to follow to the letter.' '1 64
B. The Majority's Use of Temporary/Permanent Labeling
Another problem with the Tahoe decision was the Supreme
Court's distinction between "temporary" and "permanent" regula-
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,
482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (holding that if a taking has occurred, it is irrelevant whether
the government regulation is permanent or temporary); Griggs v. Allegheney County,
369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) (holding that a landing path for an airport that interfered with
the plaintiff's air rights was an easement and thus compensable under the Fifth
Amendment); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (finding a compensa-
ble taking in the form of an easement, even though many uses of the land remained
available to the plaintiff).
162. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
163. See Epstein, supra note 68, at 1377 ("Partial takings ... though virtually total
in form, will remain uncompensated."); Boyd, supra note 86, at 406 (noting this di-
chotomy may be inconsistent with the another purpose of the Takings Clause-to
restrain the appetite of the government).
164. Epstein, supra note 68, at 1377.
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tions. 65 In his dissent, Chief Justice Renquist noted that neither
the Takings Clause, nor case law supports such a finding. 166 To that
end, the Supreme Court's decision in First English explicitly states
that when a compensable taking has occurred, its irrelevant
whether the regulation is temporary or permanent in nature. 67
Nevertheless, the Court in Tahoe distinguished "temporary" regu-
lations from "permanent" ones in their takings analysis.1 68 This is
problematic, because courts may interpret this decision as implying
that the takings question turns "entirely on the initial label given to
a regulation, a label that is often without much meaning. 1' 69 Land
use regulations, however, are often very tenuous. There are many
instances where a regulation that permanently restricts the use of
one's land is later repealed, altered, or withdrawn. In Lucas, the
"permanent" prohibition the Court held to be a taking lasted less
than two years, because it was eventually amended to allow the
issuance of certain residential development. 170 By contrast, the
"temporary" moratoria at issue in Tahoe lasted thirty-two
months.171 Allowing this permanent/temporary labeling into regu-
latory takings jurisprudence creates the incentive for legislative
bodies to label all regulations "temporary" and repeatedly extend
them for long periods of time. 72
IV. A DIFFERENT FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY
TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Regulatory takings jurisprudence needs reevaluation. This im-
portant area of law has become muddled with confusing and con-
flicting concepts such as conceptual severance, temporary/
permanent labeling, and the partial/total takings distinction. It is
disconcerting when a landowner could have the majority of her
land restricted by a regulation, suffer a significant economic loss,
165. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Ass'n, 535 U.S.
302, 331-33 ("Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner's use of the entire area is
a taking of 'the parcel as a whole,' whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes
a dimunition in value is not.").
166. Id. at 346-48 (Renquist, C.J., dissenting).
167. See First English Lutheran Evangelical Church v. Los Angeles County, 482
U.S. 304, 318 (1987) ("Temporary takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of
his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Consti-
tution clearly requires compensation.").
168. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
169. Id. at 346-48.
170. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1011-12 (1992).
171. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 346-48.
172. Id.
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and yet still be unsure whether or not she will receive compensa-
tion under a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Unfortunately, this
is often the case under currents takings law jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe helped ease this concern
by rejecting the doctrine of temporal severance, and endorsing the
dismissal of conceptual severance from takings analysis.1 73 Never-
theless, the Court's holding failed to extinguish the partial/total dis-
tinction that has made defining a landowner's property interest
difficult, and may have introduced the permanent/temporary label-
ing of regulations to the takings framework. 174
Instead of relying on this confusing approach, the Court should
adopt a takings analysis that measures loss from the standpoint of
the landowner. As noted, this partial/total distinction is flawed be-
cause it generally leads to uncompensated deprivation of property
that is inconsistent with the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.175
Eliminating this distinction, and determining value in accordance
with what the landowner has actually given up, would prevent
landowners from "bearing public burdens that should be borne by
the public as a whole.' 1 76 This distinction between total and partial
takings should only be relevant when determining how much com-
pensation is required, or when attempting to decipher the actual
loss of the property owner. Thus, a just application of the Takings
Clause requires the government to compensate property owners
for what they have taken. After all, "[I]t should be the owner's
loss, not the taker's gain, that is the measure of the value of prop-
erty taken. "177
Critics of this maxim point to Justice Holmes' statement in Penn-
sylvania Coal, where he warned that "government could hardly go
on if, to some extent, values incident to property could not be di-
minished without paying for every such change in the general
law.' 1 78 It is possible, however, under the proposed takings analy-
sis to protect the constitutional rights of property owners and pre-
vent legislatures from facing the financial constraints of
compensating property owners for every government regulation.
First, petitioners must overcome the nuisance exception by show-
ing that they are not using their property in a way contrary to the
173. Id. at 330.
174. Id. at 346-48.
175. See supra notes 155-163 and accompanying text.
176. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
177. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
178. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already placed upon land ownership.' 1 79 Otherwise, the regulation
is a permissible exercise of police power, and not compensable.
Second, following Justice O'Connor's advice in Palazollo, takings
claims must be carefully examined by "weighing all of the relevant
circumstances and particular facts of each case.' i8  Courts would
balance a number of factors in this analysis, such as those outlined
in Penn Central.81' Thus the plaintiff would have to show evidence
of actual financial loss as a result of the regulation, and that no
reciprocal benefit is created in their property that negates any loss
they would have. This takes into account both the present and fu-
ture value of the land, because these two concepts are clearly inter-
twined when measuring a landowner's loss.
Similarly, this temporary/permanent labeling suggested by the
Tahoe court should be discarded, because it is inconsistent with the
tenuous nature of land use regulations and can only lead to inequi-
table results . 2 From a landowner's standpoint, it is irrelevant
whether he suffers severe economic loss at the hands of a "tempo-
rary" or "permanent" regulation. While the length of a regulation
is a factor in determining its overall reasonableness, consistency
with State property law, and effect upon the landowner, the label-
ing of such regulations only serves to create confusion and en-
courage the uncompensated deprivation of property."8 3
These factors discussed above provide an ample filter for takings
claims. If plaintiffs are able to overcome these hurdles, it is likely
they have been the victim of a taking compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. As illustrated in examples throughout this Comment
our takings jurisprudence is in need of some repair. By focusing on
the nature and extent of the landowner's loss and evaluating tak-
ings on a case-by-case basis, courts can uphold the protection of
private property set forth in the Bill of Rights.
179. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 350-51.
180. Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181. The Penn Central factors include: 1) the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant, 2) the extent that the regulation interferes with the landowners "reason-
able investment-backed expectations," and 3) the overall character of the government
action. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
182. See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
183. Id.
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